Redistricting Texas Style

 

Redistricting has become an increasingly politicized process in Texas over the past several decades, but even more sharply so since the 1990 census. The constitutionally mandated redrawing of district lines for purposes of representation in the state legislature and the U.S. Congress has always been used to favor some interests over others. But the social and political changes that have occurred across the state in recent decades have raised the stakes – and sometimes tempers too.

This heightened political tension reflects intensified party competition in the state and the pressure that built during the gradual ascendance of the Republican Party in the state Legislature. For almost a century since the end of Reconstruction in 1876, Texas was dominated by conservative white Democrats who were determined to maintain their dominance over the Legislature and other government institutions. But as the Republican Party's support began to grow in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the struggle for control of state institutions intensified.

Controlling access to legislative seats during the years of Democratic dominance did not require too much political engineering. Until the reapportionment of 1921 the number of seats in the Texas House of Representatives was increased steadily to reflect the growing population until it reached the constitutional limit of 150. Even after that the rate of growth of the state's population and the rate of urbanization were slow enough that they exerted relatively little pressure on established patterns of representation. Control of the Legislature by the white establishment in the Democratic Party was also helped by a variety of legal and extra-legal devices (e.g., the white primary, intimidation) that minimized the participation of African Americans and other minorities.

After the Second World War things began to change. Three major developments upset the relatively stable system of political control in the state capitol beginning in the post-World War II period: accelerating population growth and urbanization beginning in the 1950s, the strengthening of federal enforcement of civil rights and voting rights in the 1960s and 1970s, and the resurgence of the Republican Party beginning in earnest in the 1980s.

One of the requirements of Civil Rights era legislation is that states that had a history of racial discrimination (generally, the states that constituted the Confederacy, including Texas) must obtain "pre-clearance" of all redistricting plans from the U.S. Department of Justice. This is because of the tendency of those states to engage in so-called "racial gerrymandering" – configuring districts in order to minimize minority representation. This can be done either by concentrating minorities in as few districts as possible (minority vote concentration), or distributing them across many districts (minority vote dilution).

Even though almost four decades have passed since the adoption of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, concern with minority representation continues. Indeed, as party competition has intensified, the distribution of minority voters in urban districts has become a central concern of both political parties and the state and federal courts.

Party Competition, Minorities, and Redistricting

 

Increased competition in the past two decades has led to particularly energetic maneuverings to maximize party dominance in both the Texas Legislature and the state's delegation to the U.S. House of Representatives.

In some cases, this has produced strangely shaped districts that often recall the original "Gerrymander," the salamander shaped district drawn in 1812 to favor anti-federalists in Massachusetts. In other cases, partisan redistricting has produced fairly conventionally shaped districts, but which nevertheless lack the virtues of compactness or the preservation of so-called "communities of interest."

In urban areas party-driven redistricting efforts have often led to a push-and-pull over the distribution of black and Hispanic minorities. Because these minority groups tend to vote for Democratic candidates, Democrats attempted throughout the 1990s to concentrate enough minorities in some districts to improve the electoral prospects of minority candidates, or in some cases, of white Democrats obligated to minority voters. At the same time Democrats have been careful to distribute minority voters in as many districts as possible in order to maximize the number of Democrat-leaning districts. It's a careful balance.

If minorities gained power either directly or indirectly by this, it was not always the main goal. Indeed, under Democratic redistricting plans minorities sometimes were assigned to districts designed to elect white Democrats, as Congresswoman Eddie Bernice Johnson (D-Dallas) noted in 2003.1

When Republicans have controlled the redistricting process, which has happened only recently, they have tried to disperse minorities. Their aim has been to undermine the opportunities for Democratic Party victories, rather than directly discriminate against racial and ethnic minorities. Sometimes in large urban areas, however, Republicans have had to cede at least one district to minorities, usually by concentrating as many minorities as possible in that single district. Either tendency – minority vote concentration to elect Democrats, or minority vote dilution to elect Republicans – can produce resentment on the part of minority residents and even court challenges.

Redistricting in the Dallas-Forth Worth Metroplex, the 1990s

Test

One particularly illustrative example of this trend toward increased partisanship in drawing legislative districts involves U.S. Representative Martin Frost, a Democrat deeply involved in the congressional redistricting battles of 1991, 2001 and 2003.

Frost began his congressional career in 1978 by building a multiracial coalition to defeat a conservative fellow Democrat vying for the same district in the Dallas-Fort Worth area. Already the increasing numbers of racial and ethnic minorities (and their increasing rates of voter participation) were making an impact on electoral outcomes.

After the legislature failed to draw new districts for Congress and the State Board of Education during the 1991 session, Governor Ann Richards called two special sessions on the matter that same year, and another one in 1992.1

During the second of the 1991 sessions, the state legislature adopted a plan for the State Board of Education (Plan E522) and a congressional redistricting plan (Plan C657). The congressional plan was "pre-cleared" by the U.S. Department of Justice as not under-representing minorities, and was later approved by the U.S. District Court.

This plan stayed in effect until 1996 when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld a lower court ruling in Vera v. Bush that three of the districts in the 1991 plan were unfairly gerrymandered on the basis of race. Ultimately the U.S. District Court in Texas adopted a new plan that redrew thirteen of the state's thirty congressional districts.

The congressional map used from 1996 through 2000 demonstrated a fair bit of creativity that ultimately favored Democrats. Observe particularly how District 24 (Martin Frost's district) cuts into the heart of Dallas, Arlington and Fort Worth. Meanwhile, District 6 resembles a series of small islands connected at times only by bodies of water. The federal court's actions in approving Plan C746 left the Democrats able to maintain control of the Texas delegation in Congress.

Redistricting in the Dallas-Forth Worth Metroplex, 2001-2003

The constitutionally mandated redistricting of 2001 resulted in somewhat less controversially shaped districts compared to those in the 1996-2000 plan. All of the territory in Ellis and Navarro counties that was in District 24 was transferred to District 6, while parts of Districts 6 and 12 were transferred into District 24. Meanwhile, the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex gained one of the two new districts (District 32) assigned to the state as a result of the population increase recorded in the 2000 census.

The relatively rational shape of the Metroplex's congressional districts produced during the 2001 redistricting did not result from a purely political process. Instead these district lines were included in the plan chosen in November 2001 by the U.S. District Court among several plans submitted. Earlier in the year the legislature failed to agree on a new map for congressional districts, and Governor Rick Perry refused to call a special session of the Legislature to take up the matter. After a series of legal actions in the state and federal courts, Plan 01151C was finally chosen for the 2002 elections.1

Despite the role of the courts, the new map still favored Democrats to some degree, giving them sixteen of the state's thirty-two seats in the U.S. House of Representatives in the 108th Congress (2003-2004). Martin Frost was able to hold onto his seat in the newly consolidated 24th District.

Redistricting in the Dallas-Forth Worth Metroplex, 2003

In 2003 Republicans got their turn. They had finally been able to wrest control of both houses of the Legislature away from the Democrats in the 2002 elections, opening the door for yet another attempt at redistricting, this time under their exclusive control. After a tumultuous series of events during which Democrats twice broke the quorum (the minimum number of members present) needed for each house of the Legislature to conduct business on the floor, the Republicans finally prevailed with a new map of congressional districts that put up to seven Democratic members of the U.S. House of Representatives at risk of defeat during the 2004 elections.1

Key to the Republican efforts in the Dallas-Fort Worth Metroplex, was the dilution of minorities in Martin Frost's District 24. Under the previous district map, a majority of the voting age population (VAP) belonged to racial and ethnic minority groups (see table).

  Black Hispanic Total B & H
District 3: Sam Johnson (R)
2001 6.4 12.9 19.1
2004 9.1 15.3 24.3
District 6: Joe Barton (R)
2001 9.7 11.7 21.3
2004 12.3 13.9 26.0
District 24: Martin Frost (D)
2001 21.4 33.6 54.6
2004 9.3 15.8 24.9
District 26: Burgess (R)
2001 5.1 10.0 15.0
2004 15.0 12.5 27.4
District 30: Eddie Bernice Johnson (D)
2001 40.3 27.7 67.7
2004 41.0 30.7 71.4
District 32: Pete Sessions (R)
2001 9.1 24.1 33.0
2004 7.8 31.4 39.0

Under the new plan minorities as a percentage of voters increased somewhat in five of the six districts in the Metroplex area. But the minorities as a percentage of voters in District 24 plummeted, from just more than half of the voting age population to about one-quarter.

Republicans justified the map and the particular treatment of Frost by pointing to the excesses of the Democratic Party during the 1991 redistricting effort. In short, they argued, there is nothing unusual in the new map, and it is hypocritical for Democrats to complain after everything they've done in the past.

The Future of Redistricting in Texas

Martin Frost and others dismissed these Republican defenses as "simply a smokescreen."1 They pointed out that the 1991 map was not designed to eliminate Republicans. Instead, they argued, it protected every GOP incumbent. Further, the Democrats argued, the map that was replaced in 2003 was not the one drawn in 1991, but the one drawn in 2001, considered to be much less oddly drawn and less partisan.

The various charges and countercharges suggest that redistricting in Texas has become almost a contact sport. This is really the inevitable result of the increased party competition in the state. Will redistricting continue to engender such bruising conflict in the future? Probably yes. This is because of several factors. The stakes are extremely high, nothing less than control of state government and the congressional delegation. Also, despite Republican gains, the Democrats have not yet withered away. They remain an important force. Finally, the growing minority population in the state will continue to shape the fortunes and direction of both parties.

 

Footnotes:

1 Off the Kuff online blog