While we’re not ones to complain, it’s still fair to note that the closer we get to Election Day, the more attention gets paid to horse race results in polling – often at the expense of a deeper look into what polling can tell us about the context of that election. Much of University of Texas/Texas Politics Project polling conducted during the election season aims to illuminate the context of the election and, maybe even more important now that our polling project is well into its second decade, the arc of the ongoing developments in Texas politics.
Without getting too grandiose, we’ve gathered some of the results from the recently released October poll (conducted from the 2nd through the 10th) to give some more depth to the trial ballots – and to capture some of the contextual elements of the political universe in Texas as the 2024 election enters its final days. (And, to be as gentle as possible, to start thinking about the upcoming legislative session and what promises to be a very active and interesting round of elections for statewide offices in 2026.)
1. The Texas Democratic Party continues to house more moderates than the much more homogeneously conservative Republican Party of Texas. Among all registered voters, those identifying as Republican are far more likely to identify as conservative (79%) than are Democrats to identify as liberal (63%).
Poll | Liberal | Moderate | Conservative |
---|---|---|---|
July 2008 | 2% | 25% | 73% |
October 2008 | 2% | 20% | 78% |
March 2009 | 13% | 16% | 71% |
June 2009 | 6% | 12% | 82% |
October 2009 | 1% | 15% | 84% |
February 2010 | 2% | 9% | 89% |
May 2010 | 1% | 10% | 89% |
September 2010 | 0% | 9% | 91% |
October 2010 | 2% | 8% | 90% |
February 2011 | 3% | 14% | 84% |
May 2011 | 2% | 11% | 87% |
October 2011 | 2% | 11% | 87% |
February 2012 | 1% | 12% | 86% |
May 2012 | 1% | 22% | 77% |
October 2012 | 1% | 23% | 76% |
February 2013 | 2% | 12% | 87% |
June 2013 | 1% | 14% | 85% |
October 2013 | 3% | 20% | 77% |
February 2014 | 1% | 19% | 79% |
June 2014 | 2% | 12% | 86% |
October 2014 | 2% | 13% | 85% |
February 2015 | 1% | 16% | 83% |
June 2015 | 4% | 16% | 81% |
October 2015 | 2% | 14% | 85% |
February 2016 | 2% | 17% | 82% |
June 2016 | 1% | 15% | 83% |
October 2016 | 1% | 18% | 81% |
February 2017 | 3% | 23% | 74% |
June 2017 | 2% | 11% | 87% |
October 2017 | 2% | 14% | 83% |
February 2018 | 4% | 10% | 86% |
June 2018 | 3% | 13% | 84% |
October 2018 | 3% | 11% | 85% |
February 2019 | 4% | 11% | 85% |
June 2019 | 5% | 13% | 83% |
October 2019 | 5% | 14% | 81% |
February 2020 | 2% | 15% | 83% |
April 2020 | 4% | 13% | 83% |
June 2020 | 6% | 12% | 82% |
October 2020 | 5% | 12% | 84% |
February 2021 | 4% | 15% | 81% |
March 2021 | 3% | 14% | 83% |
April 2021 | 3% | 10% | 87% |
June 2021 | 2% | 15% | 84% |
August 2021 | 4% | 13% | 84% |
October 2021 | 2% | 10% | 88% |
February 2022 | 3% | 12% | 85% |
April 2022 | 4% | 11% | 84% |
June 2022 | 4% | 12% | 84% |
August 2022 | 5% | 13% | 83% |
October 2022 | 3% | 13% | 84% |
February 2023 | 3% | 18% | 78% |
April 2023 | 4% | 16% | 80% |
June 2023 | 4% | 13% | 83% |
August 2023 | 3% | 14% | 83% |
October 2023 | 6% | 19% | 75% |
February 2024 | 5% | 14% | 81% |
April 2024 | 6% | 14% | 80% |
June 2024 | 4% | 16% | 80% |
August 2024 | 4% | 17% | 79% |
October 2024 | 6% | 15% | 79% |
The trend data shows a marked increase in the liberal turn among Texas Democrats over the course of Trump’s first term.
Poll | Liberal | Moderate | Conservative |
---|---|---|---|
July 2008 | 35% | 55% | 10% |
October 2008 | 44% | 36% | 19% |
March 2009 | 55% | 30% | 15% |
June 2009 | 49% | 34% | 17% |
October 2009 | 41% | 48% | 10% |
February 2010 | 44% | 45% | 11% |
May 2010 | 45% | 40% | 15% |
September 2010 | 52% | 34% | 14% |
October 2010 | 49% | 34% | 17% |
February 2011 | 43% | 38% | 19% |
May 2011 | 45% | 45% | 9% |
October 2011 | 54% | 36% | 10% |
February 2012 | 54% | 34% | 13% |
May 2012 | 38% | 51% | 11% |
October 2012 | 43% | 45% | 13% |
February 2013 | 52% | 34% | 14% |
June 2013 | 53% | 36% | 11% |
October 2013 | 43% | 43% | 14% |
February 2014 | 46% | 38% | 16% |
June 2014 | 47% | 40% | 13% |
October 2014 | 53% | 36% | 11% |
February 2015 | 45% | 40% | 15% |
June 2015 | 48% | 38% | 14% |
October 2015 | 52% | 37% | 10% |
February 2016 | 38% | 49% | 13% |
June 2016 | 44% | 48% | 8% |
October 2016 | 43% | 47% | 10% |
February 2017 | 44% | 44% | 11% |
June 2017 | 65% | 25% | 10% |
October 2017 | 63% | 27% | 10% |
February 2018 | 56% | 29% | 14% |
June 2018 | 64% | 28% | 9% |
October 2018 | 60% | 28% | 12% |
February 2019 | 67% | 23% | 10% |
June 2019 | 65% | 26% | 9% |
October 2019 | 50% | 33% | 17% |
February 2020 | 64% | 27% | 9% |
April 2020 | 62% | 29% | 10% |
June 2020 | 67% | 27% | 6% |
October 2020 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
February 2021 | 65% | 29% | 7% |
March 2021 | 62% | 31% | 7% |
April 2021 | 67% | 24% | 9% |
June 2021 | 62% | 29% | 9% |
August 2021 | 64% | 29% | 7% |
October 2021 | 63% | 30% | 6% |
February 2022 | 59% | 31% | 10% |
April 2022 | 60% | 34% | 6% |
June 2022 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
August 2022 | 62% | 31% | 7% |
October 2022 | 64% | 29% | 7% |
February 2023 | 60% | 29% | 11% |
April 2023 | 63% | 28% | 10% |
June 2023 | 63% | 30% | 8% |
August 2023 | 69% | 22% | 9% |
October 2023 | 63% | 29% | 8% |
February 2024 | 64% | 26% | 10% |
April 2024 | 57% | 31% | 12% |
June 2024 | 62% | 29% | 9% |
August 2024 | 62% | 27% | 10% |
October 2024 | 63% | 27% | 9% |
But the movement of the Texas' Democratic voters into more alignment with the national party has not made Texas Democrats as ideologically uniform as Texas Republicans. Self-identified “moderates” — a group being fought over by both campaigns, especially in the U.S. Senate contest — are much more prevalent in the Democratic Party, with 27% of self-identified Democrats opting to describe their own ideology as moderate, compared to 15% of the state’s Republican registered voters.
2. Negative partisanship is alive and well in Texas, which works as a powerful constraint on crossover voting. Favorability ratings of the two parties repeated across the life of the poll illustrates how intensely unfavorable views of the opposing party are more prevalent than intensely favorable views of one’s own party. In the August 2024 UT/Texas Politics Project Poll, 41% of Democrats had a “very favorable” view of their party, while 67% had a “very unfavorable” view of the Republican Party. Republican views were similar in their proportions: 34% expressed a “very favorable” view of their own party, while 69% had a “very unfavorable” view of the Democratic Party.
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Very favorable | 3% | 2% | 34% |
Somewhat favorable | 6% | 13% | 50% |
Neither favorable nor unfavorable | 7% | 24% | 7% |
Somewhat unfavorable | 15% | 19% | 6% |
Very unfavorable | 67% | 31% | 2% |
Don't know/No opinion | 1% | 10% | 1% |
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Very favorable | 41% | 4% | 2% |
Somewhat favorable | 42% | 15% | 8% |
Neither favorable nor unfavorable | 8% | 28% | 8% |
Somewhat unfavorable | 5% | 14% | 13% |
Very unfavorable | 3% | 32% | 69% |
Don't know/No opinion | 0% | 8% | 1% |
3. The crossover voting potential is small but not zero. While there has been a lot of focus on “never Trump” Republicans since before he even ascended to the office of the presidency, it’s notable how little potential there is for cross-over voting throughout his first term and into this election cycle — at least as seen in polling data. If there are Republicans considering crossing over, there are very few. Among likely voters in the October survey, only 2% of Democrats and 4% of Republicans indicated that they would be supporting the other party’s nominee, suspiciously close to both each other and 0%, neutering most claims about the potential impact of split-ticket voters — at least in Texas.
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Donald Trump and J.D. Vance | 2% | 35% | 95% |
Kamala Harris and Tim Walz | 96% | 44% | 4% |
Jill Stein and Butch Ware | 2% | 12% | 1% |
Chase Oliver and Mike ter Maat | 1% | 8% | 1% |
Someone else | 0% | 0% | 0% |
The Senate contest tells a largely similar story, with 6% of Democrats and 5% of Republicans saying they’ll support the other party’s nominee, which, if these estimates from October were to hold for actual voting, would essentially cancel each other out.
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Ted Cruz | 6% | 37% | 91% |
Colin Allred | 90% | 49% | 5% |
Ted Brown | 3% | 14% | 4% |
Someone else | 0% | 0% | 0% |
Other items provide a somewhat higher potential for crossover voting. In a question repeated every October since 2016, voters are asked whether or not (regardless of their vote choice) the Republican and Democratic parties are welcoming to people like them. Over the eight years that this question has been asked, no more than 14% of Republicans and 12% of Democrats have indicated that the other party is welcoming to people like them. It’s fair to consider this a rather permissive upper bound to the possibility of cross-over voting in Texas in the hyper-polarized times that we live in.
Democrat | Independent | Republican | |
---|---|---|---|
October 2016 | 80% | 21% | 7% |
October 2017 | 78% | 22% | 14% |
October 2018 | 87% | 22% | 10% |
October 2019 | 82% | 30% | 12% |
October 2020 | 82% | 27% | 13% |
October 2022 | 85% | 25% | 10% |
October 2023 | 82% | 23% | 13% |
October 2024 | 89% | 27% | 13% |
Democrat | Independent | Republican | |
---|---|---|---|
October 2016 | 6% | 15% | 62% |
October 2017 | 10% | 28% | 73% |
October 2018 | 8% | 31% | 87% |
October 2019 | 12% | 35% | 84% |
October 2020 | 11% | 23% | 85% |
October 2022 | 11% | 32% | 90% |
October 2023 | 11% | 24% | 83% |
October 2024 | 9% | 31% | 89% |
Nonetheless, the overall data this cycle and the lack of evidence of widespread crossover voting in recent elections suggest that the phenomenon of the "never-Trump Republicans" is more prominent at the elite level than among Texas voters. This doesn’t mean that there aren’t enough Trump apostates in swing states with razor-thin margins to make a difference. But in Texas, if you seem to know a lot of never Trumpers crossing over to vote for Harris, it’s probably a function of your social (and perhaps even professional) position rather than a sign of the mass defection of Texas Republicans.
4. Immigration and the border remain unifying touchpoints for Texas Republican voters. Yes, the economy and the impact of higher prices on the cost of living remain front and center among election issues. But while these issues may have crowded out the border in poll responses to questions about pressing national issues and what voters want the candidates to talk about during the campaign, most Texas Republicans still see immigration and the border as the most important problem facing the state.
In an open-ended item inviting respondents to say what issue is driving their vote most in the October UT/Texas Politics Project Poll, 36% of Republicans mentioned the economy or, more specifically, inflation or the cost of living, compared to 29% who mentioned immigration or border security related issues.
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
The economy | 11% | 13% | 25% |
Immigration / Border security | 1% | 12% | 29% |
Inflation / Cost of living | 11% | 10% | 11% |
Democracy | 14% | 1% | 2% |
Abortion / Women’s rights | 13% | 8% | 1% |
Keeping Trump out of the White House | 8% | 4% | 0% |
Election integrity / Election fraud | 2% | 1% | 4% |
Candidate traits | 4% | 1% | 3% |
In the same poll, 53% of Republicans said immigration or border security was the most important problem facing the state – slightly on the low end of the range of Republican responses we've seen over the last decade of polling, albeit with a temporary decline during the first months of the pandemic.
category | Democrats | Independents | Republicans |
---|---|---|---|
Feb. 2015 | 14% | 33% | 59% |
June 2015 | 14% | 25% | 59% |
Oct. 2015 | 12% | 32% | 57% |
Feb. 2016 | 17% | 28% | 54% |
June 2016 | 8% | 29% | 52% |
Oct. 2016 | 7% | 32% | 56% |
Feb. 2017 | 8% | 21% | 51% |
June 2017 | 7% | 36% | 51% |
Oct. 2017 | 12% | 30% | 44% |
Feb. 2018 | 12% | 32% | 48% |
June 2018 | 8% | 24% | 53% |
Oct. 2018 | 9% | 29% | 62% |
Feb. 2019 | 11% | 29% | 62% |
June 2019 | 11% | 35% | 59% |
Oct. 2019 | 12% | 28% | 57% |
Feb. 2020 | 10% | 32% | 52% |
Apr. 2020 | 1% | 8% | 28% |
June 2020 | 3% | 14% | 29% |
Oct. 2020 | 3% | 11% | 30% |
Feb. 2021 | 2% | 23% | 46% |
Mar. 2021 | 8% | 35% | 61% |
Apr. 2021 | 6% | 35% | 65% |
June 2021 | 6% | 35% | 59% |
Aug. 2021 | 2% | 29% | 64% |
Oct. 2021 | 2% | 26% | 68% |
Feb. 2022 | 3% | 28% | 58% |
Apr. 2022 | 4% | 31% | 61% |
June 2022 | 2% | 19% | 45% |
Aug. 2022 | 4% | 38% | 54% |
Oct. 2022 | 4% | 35% | 61% |
Dec. 2022 | 3% | 27% | 60% |
Feb. 2023 | 5% | 32% | 59% |
Apr. 2023 | 5% | 19% | 57% |
June 2023 | 7% | 39% | 59% |
Aug. 2023 | 5% | 38% | 59% |
Oct. 2023 | 9% | 43% | 60% |
Dec. 2023 | 7% | 32% | 61% |
Feb. 2024 | 14% | 44% | 68% |
Apr. 2024 | 13% | 40% | 63% |
June 2024 | 9% | 34% | 61% |
Aug. 2024 | 7% | 25% | 53% |
Oct. 2024 | 7% | 27% | 53% |
As Donald Trump continues to talk about the threats posed by immigrants, his promised mass deportations, and Harris’ failure on the border in the final days of the campaign, he is likely to find a responsive audience among Texas Republicans. Concerns about economic issues remain front and center in the national election, more or less; but Republicans’ long-present focus on immigration and border security is never far from the surface. This facet of Republican opinions remains an asset to GOP candidates in an increasingly competitive Texas — not just because Republican voters pay attention to the issue, but because their elected officials' and candidates' loudly promulgated policy aspirations, and the tone of their rhetoric, resonate with Republican voters.
5. Democrats and Republicans continue to hold very different perceptions about problems in the electoral system. Misinformation is the leading concern among Democratic voters on the eve of the 2024 election, with 66% saying that it will be an “extremely serious” problem in the upcoming election. While Republicans also express concerns about misinformation (46% say it will be an extremely serious problem), their chief concern remains ineligible voters casting ballots, with 57% of Republicans saying this will be an “extremely serious” problem (despite the dearth of evidence in support of such a concern outside of the near constant and ubiquitous claims of non-citizen voting by GOP politicians). Concerns about democracy abound in both parties, but the specific worries are different in very familiar ways.
Category | Democrat | Independent | Republican |
---|---|---|---|
Misinformation | 66% | 46% | 46% |
Ineligible voters | 19% | 29% | 57% |
Inaccurate vote counting | 23% | 30% | 48% |
Foreign government interference | 39% | 32% | 34% |
Political violence | 43% | 45% | 29% |
Hacked voting machines | 25% | 31% | 41% |
People voting multiple times | 22% | 20% | 40% |
Eligible voters prevented from voting | 38% | 35% | 22% |
People intimidated from voting | 39% | 36% | 20% |
The secrecy of people’s ballots | 23% | 19% | 20% |
(To refresh your memory, our Presidential trial ballot found Donald Trump leading Kamala Harris 51% to 46%, with Green Party candidate Jill Stein earning 2% and Libertarian candidate Chase Oliver registering 1%. In the U.S. Senate race, Ted Cruz led Colin Allred by a slightly wider margin, 51% to 44%, with 4% opting for the libertarian Ted Brown. As is the practice with our final pre-election polls, these are the results among likely voters, with respondents who didn’t make a choice among candidates given a follow-up “force” (i.e. “if you had to make a choice, who would you vote for”). To see subsequent polls by other organizations, see our Texas Presidential and U.S. Senate Poll Trackers.)