How similar is the 2026 election environment in Texas to 2018, the last statewide election in which Democrats were able to gain meaningful ground on Texas Republicans’ control of the Texas Legislature, and came within striking distance of winning some statewide races? The Texas Politics Project's deep archive of public opinion data allows us to make useful comparisons of public attitudes toward candidates and conditions in 2018 and 2026.

Much of the back and forth over the similarities and differences between the 2018 Senate contest and the unfolding 2026 race focus on the contextual similarities between the two elections (namely, mid-term elections with Donald Trump occupying the White House and the energy he stirs on the left), and/or on the candidate match-up between media savvy and fundraising adept Democratic up-and-comers and Republican candidates with negative baggage — but also with the advantages that come with being a Republican candidate in Texas. 

On balance, public opinion suggests that Democrats in Texas at this (still early) stage enjoy many of the same swings in opinion that made them more competitive in 2018, and may benefit from a notable decline in the intensity of Republican voters’ support for their leading incumbents. But however much the hostilities in the GOP’s U.S. Senate primary exacerbated divisions within the party and generated fears of a decline in Republican turnout in the fall election, polling data does not suggest a collapse of the longstanding electoral support for the Republican Party in the state, or point toward a seismic shift in either party’s electoral prospects. 

Overall, if we compare Texas voters’ attitudes toward the candidates in both elections, their views of the Republican incumbents most likely to influence voters’ interest in the election, their views of the parties, and the increased salience of the economy in 2026, the balance of similarities and differences at this stage in 2026 compared with similar polling snapshots from 2018 suggests that 2026 is likely to look similarly competitive, with a tentative improvement in the political environment for Texas Democrats – for now.

The Candidates

James Talarico and Beto O’Rourke

James Talarico occupies a similar if slightly stronger position than 2018 phenom Beto O’Rourke at the same time in his first statewide election — which, given the attention paid to O’Rourke’s campaign during his rise is no small feat. Overall, more Texas voters said that they had a favorable view of Talarico (39%) than said the same of O’Rourke at any time during the 2018 cycle (with polling conducted in February, June, and October of that year).

While this is certainly a positive sign for Talarico’s general election prospects, the data also reveals countervailing forces at work. On the one hand, as many Democrats have a favorable impression of Talarico in April polling (72%) as had favorable opinions of O’Rourke in June of his Senate campaign year (73%). On the other, Republican views of Talarico are slightly more negative in April of this year (48%) than they were of O’Rourke in June of his election year (43%) — and, while it is still early, 15% of Republicans in both February and April said that they had a favorable impression of Talarico, while no more than 8% said the same about O’Rourke in any of three polls conducted in 2018.

 

The graphics also provide a clear look at the similarity in views among independents who hold views of Talarico (22% approve, 24% disapprove) and O’Rourke (27% disapprove, 24% disapprove). The mildly more positive views of O’Rourke may be qualified by the comparatively higher share who express no affective view of Talarico compared to O’Rourke (54% versus, 50%, respectively). To the extent that this non-committal from independents may evolve into clearer opinions of Talarico in the future, they will do so amidst a heated, negative general election campaign.

It’s likely that the broader awareness of O’Rourke among notoriously inattentive independents was fueled by the media attention to his comparatively unorthodox persona, most of which was more theatrical than ideologically or politically themed. Yet overall, for all the still-prevailing tropes of O’Rourke’s meteoric rise – fueled by memories of the skateboarding, table-hopping, f-bomb dropping Beto that captured the imagination of reporters from coast to coast – there’s not much difference between his positioning and Talarico’s at this stage of the campaign.

April polling took place before an uptick in personal attacks on Talarico likely targeting conservative voters in the immediate aftermath of the May 26 Republican primary runoff. Evidence to date suggests that a major part of the GOP strategy is to negatively define Talarico as much as possible in an effort to motivate Republican turnout, while negating the potential crossover appeal that has been widely touted as one of the Talarico campaign’s potential strengths. Given the positive media attention paid O’Rourke in 2018, one of the lessons learned by Republican campaign strategists is to make an earlier, more pointed effort to define Talarico negatively — an effort well underway.

Ken Paxton and Ted Cruz

One of the common tropes of the 2018 Texas election was the belief that Ted Cruz was “unlikeable” or even “hated,” including in his hometown of Houston. The idea that Cruz was widely hated was based more on projection than data – Cruz faced no meaningful challenge in the GOP primary, and his job approval and favorability ratings had largely recovered from his ultimately ill-fated attempt to defeat Donald Trump in the 2016 presidential primary. 

Unlike Cruz in 2018, Paxton’s immediate challenge lies with Texas Republicans. While the national media may have been focused on Cruz’s perceived likeability issues in 2018, 74% of Texas Republicans approved of the job he was doing as their Senator, increasing to 87% by October just before the election. Paxton on the other hand, beset by multimillion dollar negative campaigning during the extended GOP primary, registered approval of 58% and 59% among Republican voters in February and April of this year, with 15% disapproving in each poll. 

The Cruz comparison notwithstanding, Paxton did wrest the nomination from longtime incumbent John Cornyn, so Paxton’s comparatively low standing among Texas Republicans may well reflect the long-simmering, divisive primary battle (if not the already evident fault lines it laid bare). (This effect was evident in low levels of outright support for either Paxton or Cornyn in April head-to-head general election match-ups with Talarico.) 

Whatever the weights attributed to the various causes of Paxton’s comparatively lacking levels of Republican support, the first step in the Paxton campaign will be to bring those GOP voters without a view, or holding a negative one, back into the fold. Paxton’s use of the Attorney General’s office to cater to base GOP voters has endeared him to the subset of Republicans who vote in party primaries and the even smaller share that showed up for the runoff. But the most pressing and immediate question facing the Paxton campaign is how many Cornyn voters won’t be willing to vote for Paxton in November? (And for the rest of the Republican candidates on the ticket, whether they will show up at all.)  

On another front, Paxton’s starkly negative reviews among independents makes his need for Texas Republicans to close ranks around his candidacy by the fall even more urgent. Independents’ views of Paxton are surprisingly comparable to views of Cruz in 2018. In June of that year, 17% of independents approved of the job Cruz was doing, while 43% disapproved; as of April of 2026, 19% approve of the job Paxton is doing, 48% disapprove. Independents seem no more enamored of Paxton now than they were of Cruz at this stage of the 2018 campaign, a leading indicator that adds urgency to the question of the effect of Paxton’s victory on Republican mobilization efforts. Cruz needed a boost in Republican turnout (which he got) to squeak by O’Rourke in 2018. Paxton is likely to be in a very similar situation if Talarico’s momentum among his base (and the national environment favoring Democrats) continues into the fall.

Not surprisingly, neither Paxton nor Cruz have a record of appealing to Texas Democrats. Democrats demonstrate similarly negative views of Paxton in 2026 (76% disapprove, 10% approve) when compared to their views of Cruz in June of 2018 (74% disapprove, 9% approve). However successful the GOP campaign is in propagating the idea that Talarico is not suitable for Texas, there are not a lot of crossover votes to be found.

Greg Abbott Job Approval

While most of the attention in Texas has been focused on the U.S. Senate race at the top of the ticket, Gov. Greg Abbott’s presence as the leader of the state party and the resources he can command throughout the 2026 election cycle remain underappreciated factors in the current electoral environment.

While the Governor’s strengths remain formidable, he occupies a somewhat weaker position politically so far in 2026 compared to 2018, when he won re-election against an unknown and underfunded opponent by almost 13 points. Throughout 2018, despite the national political  winds at Democrats’ backs, Abbott registered net-positive job approval ratings in each of three Texas Politics Project surveys conducted that year (+15 in February, +11 in June, and +20 in October), while this year, his approval has barely broken even in the first two surveys of 2026 (+2 in February, +3 in April).

The big differences? In June and October of 2018, more independents approved than disapproved of Abbott’s job performance, and no more than 34% ever disapproved during the 2018 cycle. So far in 2026, in February and April, 62% and 52% of independents expressed disapproval with Abbott’s job performance, with only 19% and 22% approving, respectively. 

Democratic views of the governor have also become increasingly negative. In 2018, 67% of Democrats disapproved of Abbott’s job performance in June and October polling. In each of the first two surveys of 2026, 80% disapproved.

Finally, and maybe most consequentially given reasonable concerns about GOP enthusiasm and mobilization, the intensity of GOP support for Abbott has waned noticeably. While his overall job approval numbers remain robust, the intensity of that approval has abated. In June of 2018, 80% of Republicans approved of Abbott’s job performance, 52% strongly. In April of 2026, a comparable 78% of Republicans approved of Abbott’s job performance –  but only 42% approved strongly. 

While this decline hardly represents the bottom dropping out, the incremental weakening of Abbott’s stature in the eyes of his base adds another symptom to the overall diagnosis making the rounds in GOP circles: Republican campaigns have some work to do if they are to energize their base. 

Donald Trump Job Approval

Views of Donald Trump are a key component of any comparison between 2018 and 2026. The expected Democratic advantage is based in large part on the defining impact that judgments of incumbent presidents have in mid-terms elections generally, and especially on the mobilizing effect of Donald Trump in particular.

The president’s job approval ratings are slightly more negative among Texans in 2026 compared to 2018. In that year, the president’s net job approval ratings remained even in February, but otherwise remained above water in both June and October polling. This year, more Texans have disapproved of the job he is doing as president than approved in both the February and April polls.

As much as some things change, some things remain the same: Democratic disapproval of the president in April 2026 (91%) is identical to the eve of the 2018 election in October of that year (91%).

 

Texas independents, who were pivotal to tighter races in 2018, are registering comparatively negative evaluations of the president in 2026. During the 2018 campaign, the president’s job approval flipped from 49% approving and 37% disapproving in February to 39% approving and 43% disapproving by October. Republicans might beg for such presidential approval numbers today: in February polling, 66% of independents disapproved of the president’s job performance, and in April, 73%. In both polls, only one in five Texas independents approved of the job Trump is doing as president.

For Republicans, Trump’s job approval follows a similar pattern to that of the Governor: largely positive overall ratings hide a decrease in intensity. While 82% of Republicans said that they approved of Trump’s job performance in April of this year, only 48% approved strongly, compared to 56% approving strongly in June 2018 polling, when 87% approved overall.

This decrease in the intensity of Republican approval of the unmistakable leader of their party going into the midterms underlines the dilemma downballot candidates in competitive races are likely to face in the fall as they triangulate between the base’s flagging but still broadly felt devotion to Trump, and the collapse of support from non-GOP voters.

Texans’ Views of the Parties

Hanging over all the views of particular candidates and office holders is the general state of the major parties in the minds of the American and Texas electorates. While there remains a general sense that the national Democratic Party is ever on the brink of disarray, the Texas numbers themselves don’t actually paint a terribly grim portrait – at least if the point of comparison is 2018. In June of 2018, 37% of Texans had a favorable view of the Democratic Party, while 49% had an unfavorable view; today, 38% are favorably disposed, 50% unfavorably — statistically unchanged.

When it comes to Democrats themselves, 79% hold a favorable view of the party today, 10% hold an unfavorable view, the exact same shares measured in June of 2018 (with no statistically distinguishable difference in intensity).

Interestingly, and maybe underappreciated in stories predicting GOP midterm struggles, is the fact that views of the GOP are actually stronger in Texas today than they were in 2018 — though even this isn’t a straightforward story.

In June of 2018, 35% of Texans held a favorable view of the GOP, 48% held an unfavorable view. Today, 43% hold a favorable view, 46% hold an unfavorable view. Democrats hold largely unchanged views (85% unfavorable in June of 2018, 85% unfavorable in April of 2026). However, consistent with their views of candidates and the president, Independents hold significantly more negative views of the Republican Party today, with 62% and 63% holding unfavorable views in February and April, compared to 47% in June of 2018.

The relative increase in positive views towards the Republican Party is driven by an unambiguously big increase in the favorable views Republicans hold of their own party: in 2018, barely 70% of Republicans held a favorable view of the GOP, which, as of April 2026, has increased to 82% — with the share “very favorable” doubling from 19% to 38% over that same time period. This is a rare bit of good news for Republicans worried about party enthusiasm and turnout in the fall. Whatever the expected national momentum, public sentiment toward the parties still harbors lingering advantages for Texas Republicans. The GOP’s brand exerts a stronger appeal to its partisans even as the appeal of its individual standard bearers has waned slightly.

Negative partisanship

Views of the parties among Texas partisans also continue to reveal the enduring influence of negative partisanship, which should be expected to significantly limit the potential for either party to attract crossover voters. With some minor variation, the same pattern is evident in 2018 polling data.

To wit, April 2026 polling finds 72% of Republicans holding a favorable view of their own party (38% very favorable), while the same polling finds 81% of those Republicans holding an unfavorable view of the Democratic Party, with 66% holding very unfavorable opinions. Among Democrats, as already mentioned, 79% hold a favorable view of their own party (32% very favorable), but 85% hold an unfavorable view of the GOP, with 70% holding a very unfavorable opinion.

The dynamic was similar in June 2018, allowing for the higher favorability ratings Republicans give their own party, as discussed above. While 68% of Republicans held a favorable view of their party (only 19% very favorable), 85% held an unfavorable view, including 68% very unfavorable. Fueled by the enthusiasm among O’Rourke’s candidacy and antipathy toward Donald Trump, 79% of Democrats viewed their party favorably, 33% very favorably. But antipathy toward the GOP was more intense: 85% of Democrats viewed the opposing party unfavorably, with 68% holding very unfavorable views — nearly identical to today.

These consistent findings demonstrate that negative views of the other party tend to be more widespread than positive views of one’s own party, and that the intensity of negative views towards the other party tends to be more extreme than the intensity of positive feelings held towards one’s own party. This, in a nutshell, is negative partisanship, and is an important limiting factor in any discussion of cross-over voting, or any appeal that either candidate might make to partisans of the other side.

The Context: It’s the Economy…

While Republicans may be able to rely on positive views of their party, or their party’s overall agenda as defined by the campaigns, to help drive mobilization and turnout, the real drag on the GOP ticket is going to be the economy. 

Percent of Each Group Saying that Each is WORSE Compared to Last Year
	Overall		Republicans		Independents		Democrats
	June 2018	April 2026	June 2018	April 2026	June 2018	April 2026	June 2018	April 2026
The National Economy	22%	55%	6%	29%	24%	74%	38%	84%
The Texas Economy	16%	46%	3%	21%	23%	64%	26%	72%
Their Personal Economic Situation	20%	39%	8%	24%	23%	56%	31%	56%
*June 2018 and April 2026 University of Texas/Texas Politics Project Polling.

No matter how you slice it, views of the economy are significantly more negative in 2026 than at a similar time in 2018, making the economy a much more significant factor in the current election. More than half of voters, 55%, say that the national economy is worse compared to last year, while in June of 2018, only 22% said so. The increase is noticeable among Democrats (38% to 84%), independents (24% to 74%), and Republicans (6% to 29%).

Asked about the Texas economy, 46% rated it worse compared to last year in April, while in June of 2018, only 16% said the same. Seven times as many Republicans (21% vs. 3%) say that the Texas economy is doing worse compared to last year, with the share of independents and Democrats saying the same more than doubling (from 23% to 64% for independents, and from 26% to 72% among Democrats).

Closest to home, April 2026 polling finds 39% of Texans saying that they’re personally doing worse economically compared to last year, while only 20% said the same in June of 2018. The share of Republicans who say that they’re doing worse economically is three times higher (24% compared to 8%), while the share of independents and Democrats both increased, from 23% to 56% for the former and from 31% to 56% for the latter.

Polling data thus confirms the prevailing impression that the economy is likely to be a major drag on Republican candidates. The more that Democratic candidates are able to keep voters’ attention on blaming Republican incumbents both nationally and at the state level for the pain they are feeling every time they pay for everyday costs of living, the more likely they are to succeed in mobilizing their voters, demoralizing (and perhaps demobilizing) Republican voters, and persuading the narrow band of uncommitted Texans.

Congress

While incumbency is a known advantage in elections, this year is not looking like a good time to be an incumbent. Many have already seen the writing on the wall and chosen a swift exit before being shown the door. Generally, polling encourages these assessments, with 57% of Texans disapproving of Congress in April 2026 polling, the same share as in October of 2018 on the eve of that election.

The Texas Legislature

With the environment as outlined above, it’s not surprising to learn that national Democrats are attempting to make a more concerted effort at contesting the Texas House — especially after failing to mount a full throated effort in 2018.

Looking at the available contests paints a picture that is actually less favorable to Democrats in 2026 compared to 2018. In 2018, Republicans were defending seats they had drawn to protect the large majority they received after the Tea Party wave elections earlier in the decade. With that redistricting effort, Republicans had a lot of incumbents to protect, and by 2018, some of those districts had become more competitive, especially in the wake of Trump’s election. Republicans lost 12 seats in the house and 2 seats in the Senate in 2018.

A look at the 2016 election finds nine statehouse seats that the GOP won by fewer than 12 points, and in all but one of those cases, Donald Trump received less than a majority of the votes in those districts — providing the Democrats with a potentially ripe target list to exploit. In 2024, seven Republican House Members won their seats by less than 12 points (two fewer than 2016), but in each of these districts, Donald Trump won the majority of the vote he failed to achieve in 2018.

While these are all fine margins, and 2024 was a GOP high water mark for Trump, they do point to a GOP statehouse delegation that was likely more “overesposed” in 2018 due to the long-tail of redistricting’s consequences and the uncertainty injected by Trump than they are in 2026. The sources of that initial uncertainty have now been incorporated into the brand and dispelled among GOP partisans, fewer of the GOP’s seats are as tenuously held, and Republicans themselves are taking playing defense much more seriously. While the general expectation even among state Republican leaders seems to recognize the real possibility of some losses in the Texas Legislature (specifically the Texas House), the Republican majority seems safe if likely to shrink. The implications here are likely more meaningful for the internal politics of the House and the legislature rather than for partisan control of state government.

Summing Up

If the structural similarities between the current election and 2018 make for an obvious comparison in thinking about 2026, patterns in public opinion add nuance to the more apparent similarities, and some good reminders of some relatively small but important differences between the two environments of the two elections.

To the extent that Cruz was the bete noire of Democrats across the country in 2018, he exited his second Senate primary with consolidated Republican support, a clear contrast with Paxton’s current situation after the extended primary cockfight with Cornyn. While it seems unlikely that a significant number of Republican voters will abandon Paxton’s cause to vote for an alternative, the similarly negative views of both Cruz and Paxton outside the party at this juncture in the two elections underlines the importance of ongoing GOP efforts to rally Republican support for Paxton.

To the extent that Gov. Abbott’s campaign, and his comparative strength in a much less closely contested gubernatorial election, was key to Republicans maintaining most of their dominance over Texas government (and to Cruz’s victory) in 2018, Abbott’s somewhat less dominant position among the Republican electorate bears watching. The governor and his campaign are clearly seeking ways to strengthen his position at this juncture as the national environment seems to be worsening for Republican candidates – and in particular, the persistent high prices keeping the economy at the center of the election agenda for many if not most voters.

Voters’ focus on the economy is a two-sided challenge for Republicans in 2026, particularly so when contrasted with Republican voters’ focus on immigration and the border in 2018. Republican voters’ monotonic focus on immigration and border security largely defined the Republican policy agenda in the 2018 campaign (and beyond). While the underlying attitudes among Republicans that fueled that focus remain powerfully present among Republican voters (a widespread antipathy toward undocumented immigrants, only somewhat less prevalent resistance to legal immigration to the U.S., and opposition to birthright citizenship), concerns about prices and the economy have diverted their attention as the steep decline in the share identifying either immigration or border security as the most important problems facing the state has declined dramatically in Texas Politics Project polling over the last two years.

This shift in the issue agenda is likely contributing to another difference that adds to Republican challenges in 2026: approval ratings for Donald Trump have cooled among his supporters, even if the overall numbers have remained steady. Independents are more negative toward Trump than six years ago. While independents’ current views of the senate candidates show no big divergence from 2018 polling estimates at this point in the campaign, their concerns about the economy is fueling greater antipathy toward the undisputed leader of the national GOP. This feeds the prevailing challenge Republicans face in maintaining their identification with Trump among their base (don’t confuse a cooling of GOP approval with an abandonment of the party’s largely unchallenged leader) while exerting some appeal to a share of independents. 

The challenge facing Republican candidates is real, but the prevailing power of negative party identification also underlines why Democratic opportunities remain constrained in a way that so far doesn’t diverge greatly from 2018. Democratic partisans may take some encouragement from the divisive effects of the extended Cornyn-Paxton primary and the other statewide run-off contests, but there is little to suggest that Democrats should anticipate a meaningfully wider band of persuadable Republican voters once the general election campaign reaches its more public phase.

It’s fair for partisans to see 2018 as both a meaningful precedent as well as a point of departure for 2026. A decline in Republican turnout is a real threat, as GOP candidates and their consultants clearly recognize: the experience of 2018 exerts a strong influence on GOP tactics and strategy built generally on avoiding complacency and more specifically on working harder and sooner to shore up Republican enthusiasm. For Democrats, 2018 provides evidence that their party can compete under the right circumstance, even as struggle to overcome the still-evident barriers to achieving something more immediately fruitful than making their opponents work harder to hang on to power.